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AUTOPOIESIS AND JUSTICE
Michel Rosenfeld*
I. JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW, JUSTICE BEYOND
LAW, AND AUTOPOIESIS

There is justice according to law and justice against or beyond
law. Justice according to law is achieved when each person is treated
in conformity with his or her legal entitlement.* Justice against law,
on the other hand, is the justice that makes it plausible to claim that a
law is unjust (even if it is scrupulously applied in strict compliance
with the entitlements which the law establishes). Moreover, to be able
to determine whether a law is just or unjust, one must rely on a crite
rion of justice that lies beyond that law—a criterion pertaining for
example, to ethics, religion, or a diflFerent order of law.
The notion of a clash between justice according to law and justice
against law dates back as far as ancient Greece where Sophocles gave
it vivid expression in his play Antigone. As will be remembered,
Creon, the King of Thebes, had decreed that the traitor Polynices,
who had been killed in the field, be left unburied, his body exposed to
the dogs and the vultures. Convinced that leaving a human body
without burial was an offense against the gods, Antigone rebelled
against her uncle Creon's decree and proceeded to bury her brother
Polynices. Upon her subsequent arrest, Antigone admitted to having
violated the King's decree, but remained unshaken in her belief that
her action had been just. Speaking to Creon about his decree, Antig
one declared:
That order did not come from God. Justice,
That dwells with the gods below, knows no such law.
I do not think your edicts strong enough
To overrule the unwritten unalterable laws
Of God and heaven, you being only a man.^

While the clash between divine law and human law is a major
theme in Antigone, what makes Sophocles' tragedy so poignant is
more than the naked confrontation between divine right and human
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I wish to thank my colleague
Paul Shupack and the participants at the Legal Theory Workshop of the Faculty of Law at the
University of Toronto for their helpful and incisive comments on an earUer draft of this article.
• See CH. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 9-10
(John Petrie trans., 1963).
2 SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in SOPHOCLES, THE THEBAN PLAYS 138 (E.F. Watling trans.,
1985).
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might. Indeed, notwithstanding her firm conviction that human law
must yield to divine justice, Antigone is prepared to face the conse
quences of having violated her duties under human law, and thus ac
cepts that she must die for her transgression against Creon's decree.^
Furthermore, although Creon's insistence on being obeyed and having
his decree enforced at all costs may betray an undue obsession with
law and order, his close family ties to Antigone—who, besides being
his niece, is also the intended wife of his son—make it impossible for
him to refrain from enforcing his decree without appearing to commit
an injustice. For how can a king's decree be just in the eyes of his
subjects if the king's family can violate that decree with impunity?"*
The tensions produced by the clash between human and divine
law can be alleviated by means of a principled and systematic subordi
nation of the positive law promulgated by human rulers to the natural
law derived from God or reason. Moreover, the integration of posi
tive and natural law results in the grounding of legal norms on extra
legal values rooted in ethics or religion. Finally, the viability and
legitimacy of a system that integrates positive and natural law de
pends on the widespread acceptance of a set of ethical or religious
values capable of furnishing a workable criterion of justice.
Contemporary Western democracies tend to experience deep di
visions concerning fundamental ethical and religious values. Conse
quently, those democracies do not provide fertile grounds for the
successful integration of positive and natural law. This explains the
ascendance of legal positivism with its emphasis on the futility of
looking to morality or religion as capable of furnishing a genuine basis
for the legitimacy of law. Furthermore, by negating the possibility of
divine law, legal positivism appears well-suited to defuse the tension
between justice according to law and justice against law. Indeed, legal
positivism invites us to lower our sights and to abandon the vain hope
of finding any universally valid measure of justice beyond law. In
stead, legal positivism offers us the more modest relative justice of life
under the rule of law.
Upon closer examination, however, legal positivism is vulnerable
3 Id.
* See id. at 144, where Creon says of Antigone;
So she must die. Well may she pray to Zeus,
The God of Family Love. How, if I tolerate
A traitor at home, shall I rule those abroad?
He that is a righteous master of his house
Will be a righteous statesman. To transgress
Or twist the law to one's own pleasure, presume
To order where one should obey, is sinful.
And I will have none of it.
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to the charge that it can only resolve the clash between justice accord
ing to law and justice against law by making it possible for law to
completely escape the grasp of justice. Operating in societies that are
significantly divided regarding fundamental ethical and religious
norms, legal positivism ties the legitimacy of law to its pedigree—^a
pedigree that seems inevitably to lead to the subjective values embod
ied in the will of a duly recognized sovereign. Whether the legitimate
lawmaking sovereign be an absolute monarch or a democratically
elected legislature, the values injected into law through the expression
of the sovereign's legislative will are bound to remain merely subjec
tive and legitimately contestable so long as some of the monarch's
subjects or electoral or legislative minorities adhere to conflicting val
ues. In other words, to the extent that no subjectively held value can
be proven inherently superior to any other, and that legal positivism
sanctions the infusion of the subjective values of the sovereign into
law, legal positivism tends to reduce justice according to law to a vir
tually meaningless formality. If law must privilege certain subjective
values over others, it is inherently unjust, and its equal application
cannot compensate for its arbitrarily unequal impact. In short, inso
far as it relies on the subjective preferences of the sovereign, legal pos
itivism not only neutralizes justice against law, but also trivializes
justice according to law.'
Niklas Luhmann's conception of law as an autopoietic system®
shares with legal positivism the belief that the validity of legal norms
is not dependent on extralegal norms. In contrast to legal positivism,
however, Luhmann's conception seems successfully to avoid reliance
on the injection of subjective values as an indispensable component in
5 Although in the course of the preceding observations I have referred to a crude version
of legal positivism that reduces legitimate lawmaking to the explicit expression of the will of
the sovereign, the validity of these observations and of the conclusions to which they lead are
in no way confined to that particular version of positivism. Thus, for instance, the more so
phisticated legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart seems no more immune to the charge of having to
rely on arbitrary subjective values than its more primitive counterpart. According to Hart, the
primary rules, or first order rules, govern behavior but are dependent on second order niles—
the "rules of recognition"—for their validity. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 9798 (1961). In the absence of objective values, either the second order rules are infused with
subjective values or, if they are "purely" formal, the establishment of the requisite links be
tween first order and second order rules through judicial lawmaking necessarily introduces
subjective values into the process of legal validation. Thus, in Hart's sophisticated legal posi
tivism the introduction of subjective values may be displaced but it is by no means eliminated.
® Autopoietic systems "are systems that are defined as unities as network of productions
of components that recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the network
that produces them and constitute, in the space in which they exist, the boundaries of the
network as components that participate in the realization of the network." HUMBERTO
MATURANA, Autopoiesis, in AUTOPOIESIS: A THEORY OF LIVING ORGANIZATION 21 (Milan
Zeleny ed., 1981).

1684

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:1681

the articulation of legitimate legal norms. Law conceived as an autopoietic system is self-referential and produces and structures its com
ponent elements.' Moreover, as a subsystem of the social system,
law's elements and mode of reproduction consist of communications.®
In other words, autopoietic law, for Luhmann, must be understood as
a network of communications that recursively produce and reproduce
communications;^ that is, as a system that marks identities and diflFerences as a function of communications abstracted from other levels of
reality, including the one that comprises the formation and projection
of subjective value preferences.'® Accordingly, legal autopoiesis, as
conceived by Luhmann, makes it apparently possible for the legal sys
tem to remain operationally severed both from extralegal norms and
from the imprint of arbitrary subjectivity by relying on self-referential
circularity as the foundation of law." Consistent with this theory,
Luhmann's legal autopoiesis may furnish the means to safeguard the
integrity of justice according to law while at the same time making it
safe to abandon an ultimately doomed search for justice beyond law.
It is Luhmaim's conception of legal autonomy that renders his
theory of autopoietic law particularly attractive from the standpoint
of establishing a firm contemporary foundation for justice according
to law. Luhmann's claim concerning legal autonomy, however, is
highly controversial." According to Luhmann, the legal system is
' See NIKLAS LUHMANN, ESSAYS ON SELF-REFERENCE 3 (1990). Luhman states that:
Autopoietic systems . . . not only produce and eventually change their own struc
tures-, their self-reference applies to the production of other components as well.
This is the decisive conceptual innovation. It adds a turbocharger to the already
powerful engine of self-referential machines .... [E]verything that is used as a unit
by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself. This applies to elements,
processes, boundaries, and other structures and, last but not least, to the unity of
the system itself.
® See id.
9 Id.
See id where Luhmann states that:
Autopoietic systems ... are sovereign with respect to the constitution of identities
and differences. They, of course, do not create a material world of their own.
They presuppose other levels of reality, as for example human life presupposes the
small span of temperature in which water is liquid. But whatever they use as iden
tities and differences is of their own making.
Id
•' Cf. Arthur Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 1647, 1675 (1989) (book review) ("Luhmann's theory of society as communication
tolerates neither values nor individuals. Values for him are what the individual desires, rather
than what is desirable. Individuals are the desiring creatures of Hobbes' utilitarian calculus,
rather than moral beings wrestling values into action through norms.") (citations omitted).
12 See ATN-opoiETic LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 6 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1987) [hereinafter AUTOPOIETIC LAW] ("Legal autopoiesis is probably most con
troversial in its insistence on legal autonomy.").
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one of a series of autonomous autopoietic subsystems that make up
the social system." Moreover, as societies become more complex, the
number of these autopoietic subsystems increases to meet developing
needs for greater functional differentiation." Although each of these
subsystems is considered to be autonomous, it maintains links to the
remaining social subsystems. Thus, law as an autonomous self-refer
ential subsystem relates to the other social subsystems as a system
relates to its environment. Or, said another way, from the standpoint
of its functional operations, law is an autonomous system that has
other social subsystems, such as the political and the economic sub
systems, as its environment." Consistent with this, the legal system is
not severed from contact with the realms of politics or economics.
Nonetheless—and this is crucial—political or economic factors can
not partake in the production and application of legal norms, because,
in Luhmann's conception, the legd system is normatively closed
while remaining cognitiyely open." Luhmann's insistence on norma
tive closure is difficult to accept, however, given the widespread belief
that political and economic values play a significant role in shaping
legal norms. Similarly, even conceding that society's increasing com
plexity fuels a need for greater functional differentiation, best satisfied
through the proliferation of self-referential autopoietic subsystems, it
is hard to imagine that the shaping and application of legal norms
remains closed to the normative input of individual actors engaged on
the legal scene.
While the issue of the autonomy of autopoietic law is crucial
from the standpoint of assessing the potential contribution of autopoiesis to justice according to law, this issue is not easily settled.
Luhmann's theory of legal autopoiesis has been the subject of numer
ous criticisms" but Luhmann has proven to be a very elusive target."
Some of the difficulty with legal autonomy stems from the fact that
the boundaries of law as a distinct practice may plausibly be drawn
along a wide spectrum ranging from the very narrow to the very
broad. Also, because of his special focus on functional differentiation.
13 See Niklas Luhmann, Closure and Openness: On Reality in the World of Law, in AUTO
POIETIC LAW, supra note 12, at 335-48.
14 Id.
1' See LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 176-78.
16 Id. at 229.
1' See, e.g., Hubert Rottleuthner, Biological Metaphors in Legal Thought, in AUTOPOIETIC
LAW, supra note 12, at 97-127; Richard Lempert, The Autonomy of Law: Two Visions Com
pared, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 12, at 152-90; Jacobson, supra note 11.
18 Luhmann's excellent paper presented at this conference. Operational Closure and Struc
tural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (1992) is
typical of the great skill with which he has confronted his critics.
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Luhmann may systematically privilege law's potential for marking
differences over any capacity which it may have to mobilize and inte
grate wide-ranging normative concerns. Finally, Luhmann's theory
tackles law at such a high level of abstraction that it is hard to get a
firm handle on the empirical implications of his claim concerning
legal autonomy.'®
While these difficulties cannot be eliminated, they can be largely
circumvented by confining the inquiry to the possible connection be
tween the kind of autonomy generated by legal autopoiesis and the
relationship between justice and law. The important question is not
how narrow or broad the realm of law is as a practice, but rather
whether there is any plausible sense of legal autonomy consistent with
Luhmann's legal autopoiesis which would provide genuine support
for justice according to law in the absence of any normative consensus
on justice beyond law. Moreover, once the inquiry is properly focused
on the latter question, it should become apparent that the key to a
satisfactory answer revolves around Luhmann's notion that law's selfreferentiality allows for a circular justification of legal norms and op
erations. Indeed, if legal norms ultimately depend on their own circu
larity for their justification, then justice according to law would be
completely independent from justice beyond law while remaining im
mune to manipulation based on the pursuit of purely subjective values
by individual actors.
Based on the following analysis of the relationship between law
and justice, and of the possible nexus between law, justice, and legal
autopoiesis, this article will conclude that law cannot achieve the kind
of full circularity required to sustain Luhmann's conception of legal
autopoiesis. The reason for this is that law as a (contemporary) prac
tice cannot be fully emancipated from the normative grasp of justice
beyond law, and, at least in part, is permeated by the extralegal norms
that inform that kind of justice. As we shall see, the impossibility of
reaching a consensus about any particular version of justice beyond
law should not be misconstrued to signify that law can altogether do
away with the kinds of extralegal norms that underlie justice beyond
law in all its possible incarnations. On the other hand, Luhmann's
analysis should not be quickly discounted, for it captures a particu
larly important aspect of contemporary legal relationships. As I shall
argue below, Luhmann perceptively and convincingly analyzes what
is a fundamental tendency of modem legal systems toward autonomy
and self-referentiality. Because of his reductionist vision, however,
Luhmann ends up mistaking the part for the whole. Properly con" This point is emphasized by Lempert. See Lempert, supra note 17, at 187-88.
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strued, contemporary legal systems should be understood in terms of
a dynamic ongoing struggle between a never achieved justice against
law and a constantly disrupted justice according to law unsuccessfully
vying for separation and autonomy. Accordingly, neither natural
law, nor positivism, nor Luhmann's richer and more sophisticated
positivistic autopoietic theory can do justice to the dynamic processes
characteristic of contemporary legal relationships. The age-old strug
gle between justice according to law and justice against law drama
tized in Antigone rages on, without end in sight. But more recently,
the form of this struggle has been altered almost beyond recognition,
as the unity of justice beyond law has itself given way to division and
struggle, and as justice according to law has—as Luhmann's theory
vividly illustrates—fought hard in the hope of gaining independence
from both God and humans.
In order to buttress these conclusions, the article attempts a phenomenological retracing, first, of the breakdown of the unity of justice
beyond law in relation to the realm of legal relationships, and then of
law's journey towards increasing self-referentiality and autonomy.
The article then focuses on the plausible scope and limitation of the
role of legal autopoiesis in the context of both the reaction against the
breakdown of unity of justice against law and the legal system's eflForts
at greater self-referentiality and circularity, viewed as two comple
mentary aspects of the same overall process. Finally, drawing upon
the conclusions suggested by the preceding analysis, the article
sketches a picture of the current struggle between justice against law
and justice according to law and of the possible place of the tendency
toward legal autopoiesis in the context of their struggle.
II. LAW AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE UNITY OF JUSTICE
BEYOND LAW

The concept of justice can be said to revolve around two distinct
unities: the unity among the subjects who may claim entitlement to
justice—to which we may refer as "horizontal unity"—and the unity
among the different normative levels at which justice may be pre
scribed, including the religious, moral, political, and legal levels—to
which we may refer as "vertical unity." One may further postulate
that perfect justice occurs where there is both full horizontal and ver
tical unity. Moreover, in a state of perfect justice, justice is not likely
to be an issue on anyone's mind, as there would be no interpersonal
disputes or discrepancies among different normative levels.
The question of justice and the call for justice only arise in the
face of some breakdown, at least in horizontal unity. Indeed, even if
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vertical unity remains intact, one person could shatter horizontal
unity by infringing upon another's entitlement. So long as only hori
zontal unity is breached, infringements of entitlement will give rise to
calls for corrective or compensatory justice.On the other hand, if
vertical unity is also broken—either because conflicting criteria of jus
tice are suggested for different normative levels or because such clash
ing criteria are sought to be applied to the same normative level—
then questions of distributive justice^' as well as of compensatory jus
tice are likely to be raised. Questions of distributive justice are most
obviously implicated when a breakdown of vertical unity is reflected
at a single normative level. In that case, members of society clash
over which, among competing criteria of distribution, ought to be
used for purposes of allocating that society's benefits and burdens.
Moreover, although perhaps less obvious, questions of distributive
justice can also arise when the split in vertical unity cuts across differ
ent normative levels. Thus, for instance, distributive justice is at issue
when acting in accordance with moral norms would lead to a different
allocation of benefits and burdens than that which would result from
the application of legal norms.^^
Based on the contemplation of situations where no breach of ver
tical unity accompanies a departure from horizontal unity, it might be
erroneously concluded that corrective justice can operate indepen
dently from distributive justice. Actually, any genuine measure of
just compensation is parasitic on some norm of just distribution. For
20 Compensatory justice "requires the transfer of goods from one subject to another in
order to restore the equilibrium that existed between these two subjects prior to their volun
tary or involuntary involvement in a transaction that resulted in a gain for the violator and a
loss for the victim." MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILO
SOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 32 (1991).
21 Distributive justice, understood broadly, refers to the equitable allocation of the benefits
and burdens produced by, or subject to the control of, a society among its members, according
to some normative criterion of distribution.
22 In some cases, a break in vertical unity may be viewed either as raising questions of
distribution or questions of compensation, depending on the perspective from which the rele
vant break in vertical umty is apprehended. Returning to Antigone for purposes of illustration,
the confrontation that pits Creon against Antigone is essentially one between the dictates of
religious or ethical norms and those of legal norms. From the standpoint of Antigone, the
confrontation concerns the allocation of benefits and burdens—or more precisely of entitle
ments and obligations—regarding the disposition of Polynices' mortal remains. From Creon's
standpoint, however, the confrontation centers around Antigone's violation of legitimate legal
norms, thus primarily raising questions of corrective justice—in the sense of symbolically eras
ing Antigone's encroachment upon the body politic. See Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction
and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal For
malism, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1249 (1990) ("Corrective justice promotes the minimal
harmony of mutual non-interference through the spread of a quantitative equality that ritualistically effaces the encroachment of a wrongdoing self upon a suffering other.").
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example, it is impossible to determine whether the proper measure of
damages in a breach of contract case involving the breaching party's
refusal to pay for goods received pursuant to the contract should be
the agreed upon contract price, the market price for the goods in
volved, or some other price generally deemed to be "just," without
relying on some conception of distributive justice." However, as in
the case of perfect justice, there may be no awareness of justice as no
one experiences a need to call for justice, where corrective justice is at
stake in the context of unbroken vertical unity, the uncontroverted
operation of distributive norms may well remain beyond the grasp of
those concentrating on the pursuit of compensatory aims.
Law, like justice, can be viewed as becoming a matter of concern
upon the dissolution of some mythic perfect unity. Modem legal sys
tems, moreover, are the product of division among social groups and
of conflicts that aUenate the individual from the group. As Roberto
Unger points out, modem legal systems prevalent in Westem democ
racies are characterized by, among other things, group pluralism"
and general mles of law that are imiversally applicable to all, regard
less of status or group affUiation,^' while prescribing duties and enti
tlements to individuals." Furthermore, in Westem democracies, the
function of adjudication tends to be sharply separated from that of
legislation," with a view towards shielding the judicial resolution of
legal disputes from the politics that inevitably surround the legislative
process.
The advent of the market, which, as Max Weber has stated, is "a
relationship which transcends the boundaries of neighborhood, kin
ship group, or tribe,"^® provides the tuming point towards the greater
differentiation characteristic of modem legal systems. As recounted
by Weber, economic scarcity prompted individuals to leave their own
communities in order to exchange goods with strangers at market. In
dealing with such strangers, however, individuals could not rely on
the kinship mles that govemed relationships within their own com
munity, and therefore had to look to universally applicable laws capa
ble of transcending the local biases of intracommunal norms." In
23 For a more extended discussion of the necessary link between corrective and distributive
criteria in the context of a breach of contract, see id. at 1255 n.l34.
24 See ROBERT UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 66 (1976)
25 See id. at 69.
26 See id. at 83, 86.
22 See, e.g., U.S. CONST, arts. I and III, providing for separation between the legislative
and judiciary powers of the United States.
28 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 637 (Gunther Roth & Clause Wittish eds.,
1968).
29 See id.; see also Richard Miinch, Differentiation, Rationalization, Interpretation: The
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other words, interactions in noncommunal spheres between strangers
with different ethical and religious values require clearly differentiated
laws that scrupulously avoid taking sides with respect to parochial
issues or intruding upon intracommunal matters. This is paramount
in order to alleviate the misgivings and reduce the uncertainties con
fronting those who must leave home and deal with strangers wilhng
to trade on the market.
Given the twin aims of avoiding favoritism toward any particular
parochial values and of fostering regularity and settled expectations
regarding dealings in noncommunal spheres, procedural rules loom as
especially apt vehicles for the institution of a highly differentiated set
of laws designed to mediate interactions among strangers. Moreover,
at least in the case of the laissez-faire economic market, reliance on
process oriented-formal or procedural laws not only promotes greater
certainty in noncommunal dealings without trampling on substantive
communal values, but also makes it possible to directly serve the aims
of the market by codifying the rules of market competition. To the
extent that lawful competition insures that market transactions collec
tively will promote the common good, the procedural laws that carve
out the nature and scope of such competition at once foster substan
tive values in the noncommunal spheres while leaving intact preexist
ing substantive values operative in particular communal spheres.^"
It is important for laws designed to provide procedures for
noncommimal relationships to be differentiated from, and to avoid the
appearance of depending on, communal norms. Accordingly, the for
mal, process-oriented and heavily procedural laws designed to facili
tate noncommunal exchanges must project an image of detachment
from ethical and religious values—an image that can be promoted
through spreading of the belief that law itself can become completely
independent from religion and ethics. Moreover, accompanying and
reinforcing this image and the belief that sustains it is, of course, the
Emergence of Modern Society, in DIFFERENTIATION THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 441,44849 (Jeffrey Alexander et al eds., 1990) (The "emergence of interactions with strangers outside
the community . . . leads to the differentiation of noncommunal spheres of interaction from
communal interaction" and requires "new forms of interactions that are not covered by the
internal regulations of the community.").
30 Consistent with the economic views of Adam Smith, the morals of the market contrast
with the morals of other spheres. In the market, individuals are obligated to act out of selflove rather than altruism, as the invisible hand of the process of competition automatically
leads those who act out of self-love (but not necessarily those who act out of altruism) to
contribute to the common good. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477-78 (Edwin Canaan ed., 1976). For a more ex
tended discussion of the relationship between the morals of the market and the morals of other
spheres, see Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 875-77 (1985).
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perception—^buttressed by the sharp contrast between communal and
noncommunal dealings—of a breakdown of vertical unity in the realm
of justice, with justice according to law bearing little or no connection
to justice beyond law. Thus, as communal deahngs increasingly give
way to noncommunal dealings among strangers, from the standpoint
of justice, both horizontal and vertical unity enter into a process of
dissolution that seems headed towards a complete breakdown.
As it appears to become increasingly independent from other
levels of justice, legal justice, while retaining compensatory and dis
tributive components, tends to be concerned primarily with proce
dural matters. Procedural justice, like its distributive and
compensatory counterparts, is a necessary but inconspicuous compo
nent of perfect justice. A call to justice, moreover, may concentrate
exclusively on procedural justice even in the face of complete har
mony regarding applicable criteria of compensatory and distributive
justice. Thus, for instance, a dispute could arise on the subject of the
best available procedure needed to implement an agreed upon crite
rion of compensatory justice. What is markedly different about con
temporary legal justice, however, is its tendency to concentrate
exclusively on procedural justice to the exclusion of the other forms of
justice.
To better understand how procedural justice may acquire inde
pendence, it is useful to refer to the distinction made by John Rawls
between the two different types of procedures that might lead to the
achievement of justice. The first requires both an independent crite
rion of justice to determine what would constitute a just compensa
tion or distribution and a procedure to lead to the desired outcome as
prescribed by the independent criterion. If the procedure guarantees
the desired outcome then we have, in Rawl's terms "perfect proce
dural justice'V if it does not, then we have "imperfect procedural
justice."^^ On the other hand, the second type of procedure, "pure
procedural justice," does not require an independent criterion of (dis
tributive or compensatory) justice for its validity. In this context,
the outcome is supposed to be just, provided only that the relevant
procedure was properly followed.^'^
Modem law's greater concem with questions of procedure is
most probably, in part, due to the fact that strangers tend to be suspi31 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971).
32 Id. As an example of imperfect procedural justice, Rawls mentions the criminal trial
under the adversary system of justice. See id.
33 Id. at 86.
3A Id. Rawls suggests that gambling provides an example of pure procedural justice. Id.
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cious of one another. As noncommunal dealings occur in settings
without estabhshed customs and traditions governing interactions,
matters of procedure seem bound to leap to the forefront. More im
portantly, however, the independent law applicable to noncommunal
spheres, which is cut oflF from the ethical and religious norms opera
tive in communal spheres, seems left with no more desirable path to
justice than that of pure procedural justice. Indeed, where the adop
tion of any substantive criterion of justice would smack of parochial
ism, the pursuit of pure procedural justice looms as the best possible
alternative.
To the extent that free market competition guarantees achieve
ment of the common good, implementation of the laws needed to sus
tain the free market would produce pure procedural justice.
Moreover, among the most important of these laws would be laws
regarding contract formation designed to maximize freedom of con
tract.^' Thus, assuming the existence of such laws, justice would re
quire the enforcement of freely entered into contracts not because of
the nature of the contractual terms involved, but because of the fact
that the contractors had freely availed themselves of the rules of con
tract formation and freely agreed upon the terms of their mutual con
tractual obligations.'®
In sum, under optimal conditions and in the presence of a free
market model of noncommunal relationships, law acquires indepen
dence from other normative spheres, and its implementation is capa
ble of producing pure procedural justice. Under these circumstances,
moreover, justice beyond law has most likely become fragmented and
largely cast away to a distant horizon. Justice according to law can
then claim both independence and self-sufficiency inasmuch as it gen
erates pure procedural justice.
As the market tends to become all-encompassing and local com
munities recede towards the vanishing point, justice according to law
tends to dwarf justice against law and pure procedural justice be
comes increasingly sweeping. At the logical culmination of this pro
cess, it would appear that law would achieve complete independence
and that justice according to law relying on pure procedural justice
would occupy the entire domain of justice, rendering justice beyond
law completely superfluous. In reality, however, this state of affairs is
impossible to realize for at least two principal reasons. First, the ex35 Cf. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 625 (1983) ("A regime of contract is just another legal name for a market.").
36 For a more extended discussion of the possible relation between freedom of contract and
pure procedural justice, see Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 792-93, 804-05.
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pulsion of ethical and religious values from the market is only possible
so long as these values can find an outlet for expression in local com
munities that remain beyond the reach of the market. Thus, while
economic exchanges take place among strangers, religious and ethical
activities can remain largely confined to local communities among
one's family and kinship groups. Relationships among strangers can
be sustained to the extent that they are complemented by strong com
munal bonds. If local communities were to give complete way to
market relationships, however, then all intersubjective relationships
would be among strangers, and individuals would risk losing all sense
of identity unless they could find a way to forge ethical or religious
bonds with the strangers they encounter on the market. In short,
either ethical and religious concerns are confined to communal
spheres that remain beyond the market or they are bound to irrupt on
the market for lack of any other available outlet.^'
The second principal reason why justice according to law can
never come to occupy the entire domain of justice is that market com
petition is never perfect, and, even if perfect competition could be
achieved in the economic sense, the market would still automatically
fail to promote a universally acceptable conception of the common
good. Moreover, to the extent that unfettered economic competition
must be curbed for the common good or public welfare, one must
look beyond the market and justice according to law to find legal
norms that will prove just and efficacious. So long as the public wel
fare is perceived as requiring that market relationships be curbed
rather than eliminated, justice according to law and pure procedural
justice are certain to retain legitimacy within a part of the domain
encompassed by justice. The remainder of that domain, however, will
call for justice beyond law (and laws embodying norms derived from
the latter kind of justice). For example, let us assume that unlimited
freedom of contract is deemed unjust insofar as it fosters exploitation
of the weak by the powerful, but that the limitation of freedom of
contract through the implementation of minimum wage and maxi
mum work hours legislation would suffice to prevent exploitation in
labor relations. Under these circumstances, a labor contract would be
just, in part because its terms satisfied the minimum wage, maximum
hours laws, and beyond that, because of the fact that the contractors
freely and mutually agreed to enter into it. Furthermore, the mini37 Cf. GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 148 (T. Knox trans., 1967) ("[C]ivil society
tears the individual from his family ties, estranges the members of the family from one another,
and recognizes them as self-subsistent persons .... Thus the individual becomes a son of civil
society which has as many claims upon him as he has rights against it.").
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mum-wage/maximum-hours laws would not be just in themselves,
but only in reference to some expression of justice beyond law which
would itself have to be legitimated in terms of adherence to certain
extralegal norms; for example, it is unethical or contrary to religious
dogma to exploit human beings. Inasmuch as the labor contract is
just because of the fact of agreement, there is room left for pure proce
dural justice. But since the determination of how much room ought to
be left for pure procedural justice requires recourse to justice beyond
law, in the last analysis the legitimacy of pure procedural justice also
depends on extralegal norms.
There is no fixed point at which communal concerns spill over
into an expanding market sphere, nor is there a clear line dividing
what ought to be left to the free market from what should be placed
beyond its reach. There is also no set prescription concerning how the
emerging community of strangers might find a suitable equilibrium
between seeking to transform market relationships from within and
attempting to circumscribe them through confrontation with
nonmarket norms. All those issues are the subject of an ongoing, dy
namic process which involves confrontation as well as accommoda
tion, and which is therefore likely to produce numerous boundary
shifts. One thing, however, does remain constant throughout the un
folding of this process: the presence of justice beyond law. Although
it has become prey to fragmentation and to seemingly irresolvable in
ternal clashes, justice beyond law is either present implicitly or it is
present as the antagonist from whom justice according to law seeks,
but ultimately fails, to wrest an independent existence.
The fragmentation of justice beyond law makes for extralegal
norms that are highly contestable and that thus lend only the most
precarious support to the laws which they purport to justify. One
way to strengthen that support and to seemingly reverse the process
of fragmentation is for justice beyond law explicitly to embrace plurahsm as the paramount extralegal norm. In other words, instead of
abandoning the sphere of justice beyond law to a hopeless contest
among antagonistic extralegal norms, one may adopt pluralism as the
best means to introduce unity in the shaping of legal norms without
sacrificing the diversity generated by the coexistence of antagonistic
norms.
Commitment to pluralism also leads to formalism and
proceduralism, although not necessarily for the same reasons as does
a devotion to market competition. From the standpoint of a pluralis
tic philosophy, diversity and tolerance of different normative outlooks
are fundamental values. Pluralism recognizes the importance of jus-
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tice beyond law, but insists on maintaining a clear divide between it
and justice according to law, in an effort to avoid privileging some sets
of competing extralegal norms over others. Accordingly, the formal
ism and proceduralism sought by pluralism are not meant to weaken
or eliminate justice beyond law, but instead to infuse law with a mea
sure of neutrality sufficient to permit a peaceful coexistence between
diverse conceptions of justice beyond law. In short, pluralism seeks to
maintain the differentiation of law from extralegal norms, in order to
insure as much as possible that law will not stand in the way of the
pursuit of different conceptions of justice beyond law and of the com
mon good. Although pluralism may be capable of encompassing sev
eral different conceptions of justice beyond law, it ultimately fails to
promote a legal system that is genuinely neutral with respect to all
extralegal norms. Indeed, to avert self-contradiction and self-destruc
tion, pluralism can only protect those sets of extralegal norms that
can peacefully coexist with competing norms.^® Because of this, plu
ralism must sacrifice neutrality and resort to privileging mutually
compatible norms over incompatible ones.^' In the end, pluralism it
self must be counted as a substantive value that informs a particular
conception of justice beyond law. Pluralism is unique because it re
quires sustaining the divide between justice according to law and jus
tice beyond law as part of its strategy towards the realization of its
own conception of justice beyond law. And thus, neither pluralism,
nor formalism, nor proceduralism invoked in response to the break
down of the unity of justice beyond law seems capable of eliminating
the nexus between law and extralegal norms, or fully liberating justice
according to law from its moorings in justice beyond law.
III. LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS, THE BREAKDOWN OF JUSTICE
BEYOND LAW, AND THE TURN TOWARDS SELFREFERENTIAL CLOSURE

As already briefly noted, the cornerstones of legal autopoiesis are
38 For example, religious diversity is only possible so long as the adherents to one religion
are prepared to tolerate the expression of other religious beliefs and practices. Crusading reli
gions that preach forced conversions and intolerance of the infidel could accordingly only be
tolerated by pluraUsts at the risk of undermining religious diversity. At the very least, the
protection of religious pluralism offers a more favorable environment for non-crusading reli
gious than for their crusading counterparts. For a more extended discussion of the paradox
produced as a consequence of toleration of the intolerant, see Michel Rosenfeld, Extremist
Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (1987) (book review).
39 Cf. UNGER, supra note 24, at 129 ("[T]he conditions of liberal society require that the
legal order be seen as somehow neutral or capable of accommodating antagonistic interests
.... Yet every choice among different interpretations of the rules, different laws, or different
procedures for lawmaking necessarily sacrifices some interests to others.").
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a conception of law, in particular, and society, in general, as networks
of communication; the existence of a degree of social complexity that
calls for a high level of functional diflFerentiation; the generation of
conflict as a means to the creation and application of legal norms; selfreferentiality and circularity; the legal (sub)system's normative clo
sure combined with its cognitive openness towards other spheres of
social interaction construed as the legal system's environment; and
the independence of the legal system as a self-referential network of
(legal) communications from the intentions of the persons who engage
in legal discourse.
As Gunther Teubner emphasizes, legal systems are not bom
autopoietic; they can evolve towards greater self-referentiality and
thus become autopoietic.'*® Moreover, the crucial moment in the
evolution from an allopoietic to an autopoietic legal system is the
"central shift from 'extemal' societal mechanisms of evolution to 'in
ternal' legal mechanisms ... in the sense that extemal mechanisms
can only have a 'modulating' effect on legal developments while the
evolutionary primacy passes over to internal structural determina
tion."*^ On the other hand, as Luhmann makes clear, the principal
task of law is to stabilize expectations.'*^ Now, in the context of a
fully normatively integrated community where the vertical unity of
justice remains intact, the stability of expectations would seem clearly
better served by an allopoietic legal system firmly anchored on wellestabhshed and largely uncontroverted extralegal norms. In the face
of a breakdown of justice beyond law, however, the contest among
extralegal norms is bound to have a destabilizing effect, and accord
ingly law may be better poised to buttress settled expectations by
turning "inward" and drawing upon its own processes and elements.
The combination of the dissolution of the vertical unity of justice
and the increasing need to deal with strangers in noncommimal set
tings creates a strong need for an autonomous legal system. On the
one hand, the lack of vertical unity of justice makes it impossible con
vincingly or authoritatively to reconcile law with any available extra
legal norms. On the other hand, because interacting strangers lack
commonly shared extralegal norms, it is imperative that they adopt
some means of regulation which can stand independently from ex
isting extralegal norms. Moreover, this means of regulation must gen^ See Gunther Teubner, Evolution of Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note
12, at 217-41.
Id. at 232.
••2 See Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note
12, at 27.
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erate, in the context of noncommunal relationships, the kind of
stability of expectations that is customary in normatively integrated
communities.
Even if the sphere of noncommunal interaction cannot be stabihzed through recourse to ethical or religious norms, it does not logi
cally follow that an autonomous legal system offers the only plausible
avenue to the stabilization of expectations. Arguably, the sphere of
noncommunal interaction could also be stabilized through a process
of political accommodation that avoided reliance on contested ethical
or religious norms. Both autonomous legal and pohtical systems
would bring increased stability to noncommunal spheres through the
deployment of a communicative process. The political system, as un
derstood here, would involve the accommodation of conflicting inter
ests through series of ad hoc compromises among contending groups
vying for power and influence in order to be in a better position to
promote their own interests. Moreover, although political com
promises would themselves be ad hoc, the political process in which
they would be embedded could well unfold within a stable political
structure—such as, for example, a parliamentary democracy—capa
ble of lending firm support to important normative expectations.
For purposes of the present discussion, the principal difference
between a legal and a political resolution of a conflict lies in that legal
resolutions do not consist of ad hoc compromises, but rather of deter
minations involving the application of previously established (legal)
normative rules, principles, or standards.^^ In spite of this difference,
however, the legal and political systems could be viewed as working in
harmony, with law—^perhaps in the form of a constitution—framing
the structure of the political. At the same time, law could also be
interpreted as complementing the ad hoc compromises of politics with
the resolution of conflicts pursuant to previously set legal rules, stan
dards or principles. Moreover, in view of the apparent complemen
tarity of law and politics in this universe marked by the breakdown of
the vertical unity of justice, it would seem that the fusion of law and
politics rather than their uncoupling (with a view to establishing two
To the extent that legal rules are indeterminate or that, as in the case of the common
law, legal principles emerge piecemeal as a consequence of the judicial disposition of individual
controversies, it may be argued that the legal system can also be characterized as involving
many ad hoc determinations. Nevertheless, as the common law relies on legal precedent, and
as even novel interpretations of indeterminate laws must necessarily refer to previously set
legal norms, all legal determinations can be interpreted as being communicatively structured as
necessarily relating to some previously established legal rule, standard or principle. For a
further elaboration of the distinction between law and politics discussed here, see Rosenfeld,
supra note 22, at 12S9-63.
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autonomous social spheres) would be most likely to lead to a greater
stabilization of expectations.
From the standpoint of autopoietic theory, however, the stabili
zation of expectations in a complex society with interweaving commu
nal and noncommunal spheres of interaction might be best achieved
through a process of increasing functional differentiation that requires
uncoupling the legal (sub)system from the political (sub)system. In
the context of noncommunal dealings among strangers legal interac
tion would promote greater stabilization of expectations than would
political interaction, to the extent that the former would have less of
an "ad hoc" nature than the latter. In other words, if people could
predict their legitimate legal expectations with a higher degree of
probability than their legitimate political expectations, then the opera
tion of the two spheres as separate and independent from one another
might well lead to greater overall stabilization of expectations than if
both spheres operated in a closely integrated manner.'"
Within the framework of an autopoietic conception of social sys
tems, the autonomous legal subsystem would be distinguished from its
political counterpart by its mode of functioning.^' Each of these sub
systems would provide a different mode of structuring communicative
interaction between social actors. Moreover, although legal commu
nication could always remain distinct and independent from political
communication, the proportion of social conflicts submitted to the
legal subsystem for resolution in relation to those submitted to the
political subsystem would fluctuate depending on the circumstances.'"
Many different considerations may enter into the determination of
whether a particular conflict should be dealt with in the political or
the legal arena. As already mentioned, the legal system seems gener
ally better suited than the political system to stabilize expectations to
the extent that it lacks the ad hoc character of its political counter
part. In one important respect, however, this may not be the case. If
the political forces are so skewed that one faction can dictate the
terms of ad hoc conflict resolutions at will, then expectations may
well be less likely to be disappointed in the political arena than in the
It is conceivable, if the uncoupling of the legal system from the political system were to
result in a much expanded political domain and a much shrunken legal domain, that sharp
differentiation between the two domains would not lead to greater stabilization of expectations.
There seems to be no reason, however, for the assumption that such an uncoupling would
result in dramatic shifts in the relative sizes of the domains involved.
See Luhmann, supra note 13, at 340-47.
^ This seems to follow from Luhmann's assertion that each social subsystem treats all
other such subsystems as its environment and from his conception of the legal system as being
normatively closed but cognitively open. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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legal one. Moreover, even if the faction in question is powerful
enough to impose laws at will, that faction would still be better oflF in
the political arena to the extent that laws are sometimes susceptible of
acquiring enough of a meaning of their own that they escape from the
full grasp of their proponents.'*' Consistent with these observations,
submitting conflicts to an autonomous legal system rather than to the
political sphere evinces a retreat from purely power-based relation
ships in the hope of achieving more stable expectations. In the con
text of a complete differentiation between the legal and political
spheres, the commitment of a class of conflicts to the self-contained
normatively closed realm of law presumably signifies both a deferral
and an equalization of power among the parties to the relevant con
flicts. Power is deferred inasmuch as the would-be winner of a pres
ent poUtical resolution of an ongoing conflict submits to a previously
established legal norm that leads to an anticipated but less favorable
outcome of the conflict in question.^® On the other hand, power is
relatively equalized to the extent that a rational decision to commit a
certain Wnd of conflict for resolution within the legal sphere implies a
willing loss of power by the strongest members of society coupled
with some gain in power for its weakest members. Indeed, from the
standpoint of society's strongest members, a change of venue from the
political to the legal arena may be desirable even if it entails a loss in
power, provided the loss is deemed outweighed by the increase in sta
bility and security which recourse to the legal system would produce.
Conversely, from the perspective of society's weakest members, it
would make little sense to pursue greater stability unless that would
increase (or at the very least not decrease) their power.*' Ultimately,
It may be objected that the absolute ruler can fare as well in both the legal and the
political arena since he or she can simply repeal any law before any appUcation of the law
places an unwanted constraint on him or her. In reply, one can point out that the unchecked
use of repeated repeals of law at will results in ad hoc resolutions of legal conflicts which would
be virtu^y indistinguishable from the ad hoc resolutions of political conflicts. Furthermore,
government by decree issuing from an absolute ruler would not satisfy the conditions of a
modem legal system. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
Under these circumstances, power is deferred rather than simply lost to the extent that
the party who has been a relative loser by having to settle in the legal rather than the political
arena may have enough political clout to influence changes in legislation that are calculated to
make him or her fare better in future legal conflicts.
Gaining security concerning further erosions of power—as modest as that may be—does
represent some gain of power over one's future destiny. On the other hand, there would be no
rational incentive for society's worst off simply to seek to lock in that status for the sake of
living under conditions of greater certainty. Furthermore, it is important to stress that these
calculations concerning probable increases or decreases in power as a consequence of turning
to the legal system must take place ex ante and not ex post facto. Given the vicissitudes of
political conflict, it is possible that over time some of the weakest actors on the political scene
might gain considerable power. That, however, is irrelevant for present purp>oses. What is
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the equalization of power stemming from a rational agreement to re
fer certain conflicts to an autonomous legal system may not be very
different from the kind of equalization that would be achieved
through a Hobbesian social contract.'" There is, however, one key
difference between a Hobbesian agreement and submission to an au
tonomous autopoietic legal system. In the latter case, the very media
tion provided by the autonomous legal system would insure against
direct subordination to the will of any individual or group vested with
the powers of the sovereign.
Based on the preceding analysis, the kind of justice according to
law that could be secured through an autopoietic legal system would
include not only a corrective component but also a distributive com
ponent." This distributive component emerges from the sharp differ
entiation implanted by autopoietic law and must be assessed in terms
of the two distinct fundamental contrasts sustained by the unfolding
of legal autopoiesis. The first of those contrasts is that between order
and disorder (in Hobbesian terms, between civil society and the war
of all against all characteristic of the state of nature); the second is
that between the legal and the poUtical spheres as autonomous auto
poietic subsystems.
The order of autopoietic law must be contrasted to the disorder
of unregulated noncommunal social interaction. By producing or
der—^any order—autopoietic law differentiates itself from the poten
tial chaos of unregulated noncommunal dealings, and insures a
significant measure of stability in deahngs between strangers. Fur
thermore, the presence of such stability results in a distribution of
benefits and burdens that is arguably far preferable to, and more just
than, that which would emanate from chaos. Accordingly, the order
established through the process of differentiation set in motion by
autopoietic law secures, at the very least, what may be referred to as
"minimal distributive justice."
crucial is the probabilities of increasing or decreasing power through political as opposed to
legal action, as measured ex ante—that is, prior to a particular choice between politics and
law.
5° According to Hobbes, in exchange for securing a right to life, the parties to the social
contract would be willing to relinquish all their other rights to an absolute monarch. See
Thomas Hobbes, The Citizen Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, in
MAN AND CITIZEN 190, 234 (Bernard Gert ed., 1972).
'1 The normative closure of the legal system insures the availability of corrective justice as
a necessary means to continued stabilization of normative expectations. In the face of inevita
ble disappointments of legitimate expectations through the transgression of legal norms, the
continued stability of normative expectations depends on the availability of compensatory rem
edies. Moreover, to the extent that an autopoietic legal system internally generates the means
necessary to dispense compensatory justice, it is also bound to produce some form of proce
dural justice.
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Insofar as the process of differentiation that sustains the legal
sphere's autonomy from the pohtical sphere produces greater stability
of expectations, it too contributes to the establishment of minimal dis
tributive justice. Beyond that, moreover, as discussed above, the pro
cess that functionally differentiates an autopoietical legal system from
its pohtical counterpart tends to lead to the production of greater
equalization (of power) in the legal sphere than in the political one;
that is, assuming that the same conflict would be equally amenable to
either legal or pohtical resolution, then its legal resolution would most
likely take place in the context of a smaher disparity of power among
the parties to the conflict than would its pohtical resolution. Consis
tent with this difference in disparity of power, commitment of a con
flict to an autonomous legal rather than pohtical system would result
in a relatively more equitable allocation of relevant benefits and biu*dens.®^ Hence, in addition to producing minimal distributive justice,
legal autopoiesis further promotes distributive justice through an, al
beit relative and modest, equalization of benefits and burdens among
strangers engaged in noncommunal exchanges.
While ah legal systems presumably satisfy minimal distributive
justice, autopoietic legal systems are supposed to do more. Indeed,
legal autopoiesis is not only poised to wrest order out of disorder but
also to furnish some kind of insurance through the use of normative
closure to stabihze expectations of expectations.'^ To reduce com
plexity, social actors seek to achieve greater certainty concerning their
expectations, and especially concerning their expectations of the ex
pectations of others. The greater the certainty that a social actor has
concerning the expectations of all concerned, the more insurance that
actor has concerning the consequences of his or her dealings with
others. Particularly when dealing with strangers in noncommunal
settings, however, cognitive expectations are subject to constant revi
sion, as they are likely to be frequently disappointed due to error or
miscalculations.'^ In contrast, normative expectations can be stabiUzed counterfactually, with the consequence that they need not be
It is important to stress the relative nature of the equalization attributable to legal auto
poiesis. It is of course possible to have very egalitarian political norms and highly inegalitarian
legal norms. All that is claimed here is that relative to the actual political system that
launched the legislation implemented by a particular legal system and functionally constituted
as part of the actual social environment of that legal system, a legal resolution of a conflict
would tend to be more egalitarian than a contemporaneous political resolution of the same
conflict.
53 SEE NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 31-40 (Martin Albrow ed.,
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985); LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 14-15, 232-33.
5^ See Luhmann, supra note 42, at 19-20.
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revised even if they are disappointed.''
For example, if I happen to expect all my business appointments
to be punctual, and they frequently happen to arrive late, I would be
better oflF by revising my (cognitive) expectation in order to minimize
the aggravation I experience as a result of counting on punctuality.
On the other hand, if the law provides that those who buy goods must
pay for them, I need not revise my (normative) expectation that my
customers should pay for the goods they buy, even if many of them
fail to pay. So long as the law remains in force, I am entitled to hold
on to my normative expectation. Moreover, to the extent that the law
provides remedies for the disappointment of legitimate normative ex
pectations, it provides insurance to legal actors.'® Finally, although
this is not logically required, the stabilization of normative expecta
tions through law is also likely to lead to a significant decrease in the
fluctuation of cognitive expectations. Indeed, it seems reasonable to
expect that in the long run a vast majority of people will tend to be
have in conformity with their legal obligations.'"'
In the context of dealings among strangers, the kind of insurance
that autopoietic law can provide in a complex, functionally differenti
ated society amounts to a benefit that enhances the distributive justice
that may be dispensed through justice according to (autopoietic) law.
Furthermore, by adding this latter enhancement to the minimal dis
tributive justice and the relative equalization discussed previously, we
get a fair picture of the kind of distributive justice that is implicit in
justice according to (autopoietic) law. This distributive justice is
purely procedural in the sense that (in light of the presumed break
down and fragmentation of justice beyond law) it does not matter
what the substantive content of valid legal norms may be so long as
these norms are regularly applied and capable of marking the distinc
tion between what should count as legal and what should be deemed
illegal. In the last analysis, the modest measure of distributive justice
compatible with autopoietic law seems to rest on two principal as
sumptions: a normative vacuum or hopeless struggle relating to jus
tice beyond law, and the vindication of the claim of normative closure
in the realm of legal communications.
55 Id.
55 I may be uncertain that my customers will pay me, but if the law provides for damages
in case of nonpayment, I will, in most cases, be assured of payment for the goods I sell.
5'' If, for example, I am fairly certain that failure to honor my contractual obligations will
result in liability to pay damages, I am not likely to have any reasonable incentive to break my
contracts. My expectation would therefore most likely be to honor my contracts, and my
actual and potential fellow contractors would have grounds to be relatively secure in their
(cognitive) expectations of my expectation.
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As to the first of these two assumptions, it is important to note
that autopoietic law does not merely come to occupy an existing vac
uum brought about by the retreat of justice beyond law, but it also
constantly endeavors to actively maintain and even expand this vac
uum through the proliferation of its self-enclosed and self-referential
processes. Autopoietic law not only offers a means to resolve existing
conflicts, but it also continuously generates conflict in order to secure
a f)ermanent medium for the recursive application of the legal norms
embedded in justice according to law.'® But by manufacturing con
flict and by channeling social interaction into conflict only to resolve
such conflict according to its own self-generated, self-referential, and
self-enclosed normative scheme, legal autopoiesis confines legitimate
legal discourse to a very narrow domain. That domain is circum
scribed by the dichotomies between order and disorder, uncertainty
and insurance, and ad hoc political accommodation and the relative
equalization of autonomous law. The confinement of law to such a
narrow domain may well seem artificial and contrived, and therefore
fairly raises the question of whether contemporary legal practice
could be more faithfully captured by leaving aside the seemingly un
due restrictions imposed by autopoietic law.
To be in a better position to answer this last question, it is neces
sary to take a closer look at the second assumption that underlies the
conception of distributive justice linked to autopoietic law; namely,
that the system of (autopoietic) legal communication is inescapably
subject to the constraints of normative closure. The task of assessing
the validity of this assumption is complicated by the highly abstract
nature of Luhmann's discussion. Nevertheless, as we shall see, useful
parallels can be drawn between the functioning of legal autopoiesis
and Luhmann's description of the phenomenon of monetarization
which he presents as driving the process of economic autopoiesis.
In a nutshell, the core function of legal communications, accord
ing to Luhmann's autopoietic theory, is to provide information con
cerning the meaning of events and, in particular, actions in relation to
the binary code legal/illegal.'® This information is not simply the
product of the enactment and application of legal rules, but rather
emerges from the circular interplay between rules and decisions.®"
Moreover, because the validation of legal norms hinges on a process
'8 See Luhmann, supra note 42, at 12, 27.
59 See LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 229-32.
Id. at 231. In other words, rules are validated by the decisions that invent or elaborate
them and (to complete the circle) decisions are validated by the rules that use them as the
medium through which they acquire a more definite shape.
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of unfolding circularity,®* neither the substantive values embodied in
particular legal norms nor the intentions projected by actors engaged
in the legal arena, can in any direct or significant way, inform deter
minations dependent on use of the binary code legal/illegal. This is
merely a further elaboration of the notion of normative closure. On
the other hand, the internally sealed circular interplay between legal
rules and decisions by no means forecloses expanding (or for that
matter shrinking) the domain of that which can be rendered legally
meaningful through submission to the binary code legal/illegal. This
seems to follow from the very notion of cognitive openness.
This highly abstract description of the work of an autopoietic
legal system can be made perhaps easier to grasp by briefly concen
trating on the analogy—drawn by Luhmann—^between autopoietic ec
onomics and autopoietic law.®^ The autopoietic economic
(sub)system, Luhmann maintains,
operates openly with respect to needs, products, services, etc., and
it is closed with respect to payments, using payments only to
reproduce the possibility of further payments. Linking payments
to the exchange of "real" goods interconnects closure and open
ness, self-reference and environmental references. General purpose
money provides for closure and remains the same in all hands.
Specifiable needs open the system toward its environment. There
fore, the operations of the system depend upon a continuous check
ing of one in terms of the other. This hnkage is a prerequisite for
the differentiation and self-regulation of the economic system.®^
In essence then, according to Luhmann's description, self-regulation
of the economic system is based on the connection between needs
(that fluctuate depending on factors located in the economic system's
environment) and a closed monetarized exchange process that system
atically mediates the complex interrelationship between the totahty of
existing needs and the network of products and services susceptible of
contribution to satisfying those needs.
In the context of a free market economy, at least, the monetarization of all exchange relationships provides a self-regulating system
that structures an order for meeting needs under conditions of moder
ate scarcity. Monetarization, moreover, promotes and sustains a
sharp differentiation between use value and exchange relationships be
yond the subjective will of economic actors.®^ Accordingly, so long as
See id.
62 See id. at 230-31.
63 Id.
64 The differentiation between use and exchange value is a function of the systematization
of the relationship between supply and demand through the communicative effects produced
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(and to the extent that) market exchanges are considered to furnish
the best possible means to satisfy needs for goods and services, main
tenance of the self-regulating economic system relying on the univer
sal language of monetarization is essential. In other words, unless the
autonomy of the economic system is maintained, the avowed purposes
of economic interaction will undoubtedly be frustrated. Indeed, re
placement of the autonomous mechanism of competition by a subjec
tively crafted economic order would frustrate the economy's clearly
differentiated function of maximizing the satisfaction of needs
through the most efficient allocation of goods and services.
Taking at face value both claims, the need for autonomy in the
economic sphere and the same need in the legal sphere, may lead to
the conclusion that there is a fundamental analogy between the ways
in which these spheres respectively achieve differentiation.
Monetarization seems to provide for the internal regulation of eco
nomic relationships, and the binary code legal/illegal for the analo
gous ordering of legal relationships. Upon closer analysis, however,
the analogy is merely superficial. Indeed, the closure of an economic
system that relies on monetarization is plausibly meaningful;^' while
taken alone, the closure maintained by means of the application of the
binary code legal/illegal remains essentially trivial. Economic closure
through monetarization conceivably fulfills a substantive function
that cannot be otherwise equivalently performed. Legal closure
through application of the binary code legal/illegal, in contrast, ap
pears to play a purely formal role and (at least standing alone) does no
more than sustain an empty tautology (as opposed to a circular but
meaning-enhancing or information-producing one).
At least in the context of certain plausible conceptions of the role
of the economy, the autonomous process of monetarization fulfills a
function that is substantively (as opposed to merely definitionally)
necessary and sufficient to propel the economic system towards
achievement of its intended social task. Thus, for instance, economic
by monetarization as an abstract and universally applicable code of quantification. Neither
those who supply goods nor those who wish to acquire them can impose an exchange value on
them because they depend on one another and on all others involved in the supply and demand
of such goods for the determination of that value which is neither subjective nor objective, but
intersubjective. For a more extended discussion of this last point, see Rosenfeld, supra note 30,
at 832-39. Rational market exchanges cannot proceed without information concerning inter
subjective exchange values which can only be systematically communicated in monetary terms.
I say "plausibly" because I am not convinced that a conceptualization of the process of
monetarization as autonomous and circular is preferable than other plausible conceptualiza
tions that place greater emphasis on the connection between the economic sphere and other
spheres of social interaction. This raises important issues which remain beyond the scope of
this article.
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efficiency may well be only achievable through the systematic coup
ling of the closure of monetarization with openness to all needs,
pr^ucts, services, etc. Take away the work performed by
monetarization—namely, providing a common measure to otherwise
incommensurable needs, products, services, and so on—and the possi
bility of achieving economic efficiency through an independent eco
nomic system disappears.
From the standpoint of a complex modem legal system, on the
other hand, the binary code legal/illegal may be necessary, but it is
not sufficient to account for the normative characteristics of law, ex
cept in a trivial tautological sense. Even conceding that ex post facto
every legal communication may be interpreted as having designated
the actions to which it refers as being either legal or illegal,®® legal
practice can hardly nontrivially be reduced to the classification of ac
tions as either legal or illegal.®' As pointed out above, autopoietic law
promotes the values of order, insurance, and equalization relative to
the ad hoc compromises of its political environment. These values are
not, however, the only ones pursued by law as a distinct contempo
rary practice. For example, the contemporary movement towards the
juridification of human rights and constitutional guarantees extends
beyond mere order or insurance. Actually, such juridification often
appears to open the legal system to contested conceptions of justice
beyond law that transcend mere communalism inasmuch as they are
specifically oriented towards the domain of noncommunal interaction.
Moreover, to the extent that constitutional jurisprudence wrestles
with fundamental values associated with justice beyond law, it is more
likely to undermine than to promote the kind of predictability neces
sary to provide insurance.®®
Hubert Rottleuthner has argued against this last proposition. As a counterexample, he
refers to instances in which adultery, while itself, strictly speaking, neither legal nor illegal,
may have important consequences for the determination of legal conflicts, such as in the case
of divorce. See Hubert Rottleuthner, A Purified Sociology of Law: Niklas Luhmann On the
Autonomy of the Legal System, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 779, 792 (1989).
It may always be countered that whereas it may be socially useful or meaningful, any
thing beyond the autonomous and self-referential process of using the interplay of rules and
decisions to communicate whether actions relating to conflicts are legal or illegal is not, strictly
speaking, encompassed within the legal system. While such an argument may be defensible
from a strictly logical or purely semantical point of view, nevertheless, due to its extreme
reductionism, it projects a distorted image that does not capture the full richness of contempo
rary law as a practice.
As examples of significantly unpredictable areas of constitutional interpretation involv
ing fundamental values relating to justice beyond law, one can mention substantive due process
and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution. Concerning substantive due
process see, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). As for equal protection, there is
perhaps no greater unpredictability than in the area of affirmative action. See ROSBNFELD,

1992]

AUTOPOIESIS AND JUSTICE

1707

The problems posed by the reductionism of the autopoietic con
ception of legal practice are compounded by the fact that order, insur
ance, and equalization are by no means the exclusive preserve of
justice according to (autopoietic) law. Indeed, order and insurance
can also be provided by the allopoietic law decreed by Hobbes's abso
lute monarch, or even through political means. Similarly, greater
equalization may be equally or better pursued in the political arena
than through the modest standard of justice according to law that
emerges from legal autopoiesis.
In conclusion, the analogy between the economic process of
monetarization and legal practice viewed as an autonomous and selfregarding autopoietic system does not hold sufficiently to justify the
claim of normative closure in the case of law. As a matter of fact, in
certain fields such as constitutional law at least, it seems more accu
rate to describe law as a practice as being normatively open to the
extralegal norms that underlie justice beyond law. Moreover, to the
extent that contemporary law as a practice is not restricted to the
exclusive pursuit of order, insurance, and relative equalization, the
autopoietic thesis seems defective as it unduly and arbitrarily narrows
the domain of legitimate contemporary legal relationships.
IV. AUTOPOIESIS AND THE CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE

If autopoiesis fails to provide an accurate picture of contempo
rary legal practice as a whole, it nevertheless captures the essence of
one of the two principal tendencies of modem law. Notwithstanding
initial appearances to the contrary, modem law does not simply con
sist of the emancipation and triumph of justice according to law in the
face of some final collapse of justice beyond law. Instead, the ascen
dance of justice according to law is accompanied by a movement to
wards the reconstitution of justice beyond law.®' More precisely.
supra note 20, at ch. VII; Michel Rosenfeld, Metro-Broadcasting v. FCC: Affirmative Action at
the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 583 (1991).
The tendency towards legal autonomy is manifested in, among other things, the prolifer
ation of process based and procedural rules. Law's tendency towards extralegal norms, on the
other hand, becomes apparent in legal doctrines that rely explicitly on extralegal values. In
American constitutional law, the interplay between these two tendencies is exemplified in the
contrast between procedural and susbstantive due process rights under the fourteenth amend
ment's due process clause. The tendency towards extralegal values, however, is not limited to
public law. Several legal scholars, for example, have sought to account for contemporary con
tractual relationships in terms of extra-legal norms. See, e.g., PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE
(1981); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SO
CIAL CONTRACT (1980).
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contemporary law appears to be the product of an ongoing clash be
tween two contradictory drives: the drive towards autonomy and that
towards the reestablishment of the vertical unity of justice.'" One of
the dynamic functions of contemporary legal actions and communica
tions is to continuously produce sufficient normative diflferentiation in
order to avert the dissolution of the legal sphere through absorption
into the theologico-ethical or political sphere. On the other hand,
clashing against this relentless pursuit of differentiation is contempo
rary law's insatiable need to work towards the recovery of the lost
vertical unity of justice. Accordingly, the first of these two drives fu
els contemporary law's tendency towards autopoiesis and autonomy
while the second, on the contrary, pulls law away from autopoietic
self-referentiality.
Contemporary law cannot genuinely resolve the tension between
its conflicting tendencies without losing either its identity or its legiti
macy. Paradoxically, contemporary law is more likely to fulfill its
role by seeking to maintain an equilibrium between its conflicting ten
dencies than by striving to minimize contradiction through a dispro
portionate development of one of these basic tendencies at the expense
of the other. Moreover, the reason why the unrelenting pursuit of
such an equilibrium is essential is because—contrjuy to Luhmann's
assertion—the function of contemporary law is not merely one of dif
ferentiation but also one of unification. Finally, the justification for
contemporary law's simultaneous pursuit of both unification and dif
ferentiation is extrinsic rather than intrinsic to law. As we shall see,
contemporary law's tendency towards autopoiesis may be justified as
part of a larger whole, but only in terms of extralegal norms. In other
words, it is legitimate for law to turn inward, but only because that
tends to promote the integration of law in the larger social matrix in
accordance with extralegal norms poised to permeate social life as a
whole.
•'o The constitutional jurisprudence of due process provides a clear glimpse of this clash.
Indeed, the interplay between procedural due process and substantive due process illustrates,
through the implementation of procedural due process, how the search for legal autonomy
collides with the recurring need to appeal to extra-legal norms through substantive due pro
cess. The recognition of substantive rights has repeatedly prevented due process from becom
ing exclusively procedural. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (due
process implies a fundamental right of privacy); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(due process implies certain fimdamental economic rights). However, the very determination
of purely procedural due process rights may often be impossible without reference to substan
tive rights grounded on fundamental extralegal values. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (determination of procedural due process rights depends on conceptions of liberty and
property that are ultimately traceable to fundamental extralegal norms); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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The paradox presented by contemporary law's turn inward as
part of its bid to recover the vertical unity of justice can be unraveled
by reference to the social forces that shape contemporary legal rela
tionships. The function of these relationships is not simply to produce
difFerentiation or, on the contrary, to foment the unification of legal
and extralegal norms. Instead, the function of contemporary law is to
produce differentiation and promote unification simultaneously as
prevailing circumstances make the possibiUty of reconciling legal
norms with extralegal values conditional on carving out a distinct
sphere of differentiation.
The meaning of the movement towards legal autonomy is prone
to being misinterpreted to the extent that law's turn inward is overdetermined and that the full reason for it is likely to remain dissimu
lated. Contemporary legal relationships are inscribed in a normative
universe animated by the necessity to eliminate communal norms
from the sphere of noncommunal relationships, and to replace them
with noncommunal—or more precisely, transcommunal—norms.
Accordingly, on the one hand, law must turn inward to escape from
both the grasp of past parochialisms and from the temptations of fu
ture parochialisms.^* But, on the other hand—and this is much more
likely to escape notice—^the law must also turn inward as a means to
the reconstitution of justice beyond law consistent with the establish
ment of extralegal norms with transcommunal appeal. At the very
least, the differentiation produced by law's inward turn should serve
as a communicative vehicle designed to dispel the notion that the ex
tralegal norms sought to be given transcommunal validity are but the
old parochial norms bent on venturing beyond their legitimate territo
rial boundaries. However, in the case of the pursuit of pluralism—
which, as noted above, involves the estabhshment of substantive val
ues rather than merely procedural ones'^—^the tendency towards legal
autonomy plays a key role in, and is an integral part of, the systematic
task of reconstituting the normative unity of the domain of noncom71 As an example of such an inward turn, one may cite the evolution of the English and
American law of contract between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This evolution saw
the replacement of substantive contract rules based on custom by process oriented rules relat
ing both to contract formation and to the measure of damages. Moreover, the development
and use of those process-oriented rules not only permitted abandoning locally rooted past cus
toms but also made it possible to shield contractual relationships from future intermeddling in
the name of extralegal norms. For a more extended discussion of this aspect of the evolution
of contract law in the nineteenth century, see Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 821-27.
72 In other words, preservation of the tendency towards legal autonomy protects against
relapses into communal factionalisms while reaching out for transcommunal, extralegal
norms.
72 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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munal interaction. Indeed, without maintenance of the movement to
wards legal autonomy, there would be no room for the peaceful
coexistence of the different value systems that are compatible with
pluralism. In view of pluralism's normative aim to accommodate as
many different value systems as are compatible with it, the tendency
towards legal autonomy associated with it should be interpreted as
part and parcel of the pluralist effort to reconstitute justice beyond
law so as to legitimately empower it over noncommunal relationships.
Any attempt to reconstitute justice beyond law from the stand
point of pluralism, however, seems ultimately bound to fail. Viewing
communal extralegal norms as first order norms, plurahsm generates
a second order of norms. These second order or transcommunal
norms are supposed to provide a unified normative framework for the
reconstitution of justice beyond law. Within this framework, first or
der norms are not suppressed but merely subordinated to second or
der norms. For some first order norms, subordination means
displacement. For example, pluralism is compatible with the embrace
of certain particular religious norms, provided that the latter are rele
gated to the private sphere.^'^ Furthermore, for other first order
norms, subordination to second order pluralist norms means, in effect,
ehmination. Thus, for instance, crusading religions and rigidly antipluralistic moral and political norms can be given no room in a nor
mative universe sought to be unified under pluralist values.^' Now,
since pluralism cannot do without any first order norms (indeed, plu
ralism is meaningless without at least some available choice among
different first order norms) and because it cannot accommodate all
first order norms, any pluralist attempt at reconstituting justice be
yond law is in some sense arbitrary inasmuch as it incorporates some
first order norms while excluding others. In other words, pluralism
cannot avoid making choices among competing first order norms in
the course of its attempted reconstitution of justice beyond law. From
the standpoint of the first order norms left out, however, pluralism's
attempted reconstitution of justice beyond law cannot overcome the
breakdown in the vertical unity of justice as it necessarily privileges
some of the contending first order norms over others.
cf. KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216-248 (Loyd D. Easton & Kurt H. Guddat trans. & eds., 1967)
(arguing that religious emancipation can only be obtained at the cost of relegating religion to
the private sphere).
73 Arguably, crusading religions and antipluralistic ethical and political creeds could be
partly accommodated in the normative universe of the pluralist. To the extent that antipluralist values are an essential and inseparable component of a given value system, however, partial
accommodation could well be tantamount to outright rejection.
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We are now in a position to see more clearly the place of legal
autonomy in pluralism's attempted reconstitution of justice beyond
law in the face of the predominance of dealings among strangers.
Legal autonomy plays both a negative and a positive role in such at
tempted reconstitution. The negative role consists in uprooting, and
cutting loose from, first order extralegal norms in order to overcome
the obstacles interposed by communal parochialisms. If legal auton
omy were exclusively used for purposes of performing this negative
role, however, it would promote nihihsm instead of furthering plural
ism. To serve the aims of plurahsm, therefore, legal autonomy must
also contribute to the positive function of reintegrating uprooted first
order norms under the legitimating aegis of hierarchically superior
second order norms. But, since these second order norms are ulti
mately extralegal in nature (in other words, pluralism is not an inher
ently legal norm), legal autonomy's positive contribution must be
indirect in nature. Specifically, legal autonomy's indirect positive
contribution to pluralism consists of furnishing the space necessary
for the reintroduction of first order norms as subordinated to second
order norms. Finally, through the ceaseless concurrent pursuit of its
positive and negative roles, the legal system oriented towards self-ref
erence and autonomy tends to postpone pluralism's ultimate inevita
ble failure to recover the vertical unity of justice. Moreover, focus on
the autonomous tendencies of the legal system contributes to the post
ponement in question by concealing, on the one hand, the nexus be
tween pluralism and justice beyond law and, on the other, the
fundamental asymmetry between the legal system's role in uprooting
first order norms and its role in reintroducing such norms as
subordinate to second order norms. Indeed, for purposes of the legal
system's uprooting function, all first order norms are equivalent; yet
for purposes of their reintroduction as subordinate to second order
norms, such first order norms are by no means all equal, as only some
of them will in the end prove to be suitable.
CONCLUSION

Luhmann's legal autopoiesis represents an advance over positiv
ism, but it ultimately fails to erect an impregnable barrier between
justice according to law and justice beyond law. Self-referential autopoietic law guarantees minimal distributive justice, relative equaliza
tion, and the benefits of greater order and insurance. Contemporary
legal systems, however, are not confined to the pursuit of order and
insurance through the stabilization of expectations. Contrary to the
thrust of Luhmann's fundamental assumptions, contemporary legal
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systems must remain normatively open to the ever greater juridification of human and constitutional rights squarely grounded on ex
tralegal norms. As we have seen, contemporary legal systems tend
towards autonomy, but that represents only part of the story. Indeed,
contemporary law's tendency towards autonomy and justice accord
ing to law is accompanied by (the often concealed but nevertheless
ever present) contrary tendency towards extralegal norms and justice
beyond law. The dynamic interlocking of these contrary tendencies is
the product of the pluralist quest to reconstitute the vertical unity of
justice without bringing about the communal re-rooting of first order
norms. Perhaps, by abandoning the pursuit of pluralism and the legal
and extralegal values which it entails, it would become possible to
move towards a more complete legal autonomy. Be that as it may,
however, pluralism should not be lightly discarded for it may well
represent—^in spite of its many contradictions and failures—^the best
available hope for justice based on the acceptance of plausible transcommunal norms.

